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Mowlem also provided us with useful material. An interview with Tristan 
Garel-Jones gave us helpful insights into British policy towards the region. 
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draft of this paper, which appeared originally as 4 America Latina en la Gran 
Bretana'. in Estudios Internationales, No. 104, October-December 1993, pp. 
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paper. 
Britain and Latin America 
'Hope in a Time of Change'? 
Introduction 
In a 1990 House of Commons debate, the MP Barry Porter, while welcoming 
the aid given to El Salvador, asked Lynda Chalker, Minister for Overseas 
Development: 'should we not take into account those countries that are 
greater friends of the United Kingdom and especially, in West Africa, the 
small, but very friendly country of Sierra Leone?'1 Porter's opinion did not, 
of course, represent the official position. However, it did typify a large 
section of public perceptions throughout the country, which viewed Latin 
America as secondary if not peripheral to the main concerns of British 
foreign policy. 
This is a view that has prevailed since 1945, if not since even before then. 
Certainly, in the immediate post-war era Latin America did not feature in the 
three interlocking 'circles' where Winston Churchill perceived Britain's 
primary overseas interests to lie: the United States, the Commonwealth and 
Europe, in that order. Some five decades later this order of priorities had 
changed, with Europe finally taking the lead over both the cherished special 
relationship with the United States and the beleaguered Commonwealth.2 But 
Latin America has remained very much on the periphery. Indeed the short-
term effects of the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, which brought to 
the fore new and more immediately pressing concerns in Eastern Europe and 
the former USSR, seemed to reinforce the impression of Latin America as a 
continent which had become increasingly marginalised from the mainstream 
of not only British, but international concern generally.3 
1 Parliamentary Debates, Hansard (163), London 1990, p. 18. 
2 See Stephen George, An Awkward Partner. Britain in the European 
Community (Oxford, 1990), p. 14; and David Saunders, Losing an Empire, 
Finding a Role. British Foreign Policy since 1945 (London, 1990), p. 1. British 
policy over Europe remains, however, a source of serious controversy. 
Churchill's words to de Gaulle still find echoes in many quarters: '...Each time 
we have to choose between Europe and the open sea, we shall always choose the 
open sea'; quoted in David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled. British Policy and 
World Power in the 20th Century (London and New York, 1993), p. 303. 
3 See, for example, Jorge G. Castaneda, 'Latin America and the end of 
the Cold War', World Policy Journal, vol. 7, no. 3 (Summer 1990), p. 491. 
It would seem, therefore, that any analysis of British-Latin American 
relations in the 1990s must begin with an appreciation of the relatively low 
and even declining priority accorded to the continent by different British 
governments since 1945. Yet, as this paper will argue, developments since 
the late 1980s somewhat contradict this impression. Global changes at both 
the economic and political level, moves towards deeper integration in Europe 
and the radical transformation of the international order brought about by the 
end of the Cold War have fundamentally altered the context of British foreign 
policy.4 One result of this forced reordering of priorities has been a renewed 
and growing interest towards Latin America. This mood has been reflected 
in various official statements. In a 1988 speech optimistically entitled 'Latin 
America and 1992: Hope in a time of change', Foreign Secretary Geoffrey 
Howe promised that the 'period of neglect' was over, sentiments echoed two 
years later by his successor Douglas Hurd who spoke of Latin America as 4 an 
essential part of the new world order' . And early in 1994, Prime Minister 
John Major suggested that after decades of 'relative decline' in the British 
presence in Latin America, 'in the last few years things have begun to 
change, and change quite dramatically'.5 
What lies behind this rhetoric? Has British diplomacy towards Latin 
America really changed, and if so why, and in what ways? Has the 'redis-
covery' of Latin America affected the old order of priorities, bringing in a 
new sphere of interest? What, in short, does the future hold for British-Latin 
American relations as we approach the end of the twentieth century? This 
essay will attempt to sketch out an answer to these questions. In the first 
section we propose briefly to look at the history of British-Latin American 
relations since the 1930s to emphasise what is perhaps common knowledge: 
the steady decline in the relationship, which reached its lowest point during 
the war in the South Atlantic in 1982. Although this story has already been 
told elsewhere, we summarise it here both to provide a backdrop and to 
illustrate the contrasts with the later period. We will then turn to an 
examination of the recent signs of revival. Using parliamentary records, 
some official unpublished documents, newspaper publications, and other 
secondary material, we will look at the evidence that points to a relative 
4 See William Wallace, 'British Foreign Policy after the Cold War', 
International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 3 (1992), pp. 423-42. 
5 'Latin America and 1992: Hope in a time of change', Foreign 
Secretary's speech at Canning House, 14 December 1988; and 'Latin America: 
an essential part of the New World Order', Foreign Secretary's speech at 
Canning House, 30 October 1990; 'The United Kingdom and Latin America', 
Prime Minister's speech at Canning House, 10 March 1994. 
renewal of Anglo-Latin American relationship in the past decade.6 The last 
section of the paper will consider the limitations of this revival before 
speculating about the prospects for the long-term strengthening of British ties 
with Latin America. 
Between abandonment and indifference: 
British-Latin American relations, 1930-1985 
It has become a commonplace to speak of the gradual demise of British-Latin 
American relations since the First World War, a process reinforced during 
the 1930s by the effects of the Depression and then by the consequences of 
the Second World War.7 Yet there are a number of recent studies of British 
imperialism that somewhat contradict the impression of an imperial system 
in decline. For example, the imperial historians P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins 
have argued that South America should be reintegrated into the study of 
British imperialism in the period 1914-1939, which they characterise as 'a 
new era of colonial ambitions', in which Great Britain sought to retain its 
position as banker of the world. It is certainly true that, until the late 1930s, 
South America remained an important trading partner for Britain, with 
interests focused on Argentina, Brazil and, to a declining extent, Chile.8 
However, the nature of the relationship with Latin America overall remained 
substantially different from that of Britain with other regions in the world. 
Even if Britain did manage to retain considerable influence in the continent 
in the inter-war period, despite rival claims by other powers, the Second 
World War was to have the effect of accelerating what was a visible trend 
towards a gradual and perhaps inevitable retreat from South America. The 
6 For a review of the challenges and opportunities in British-Latin 
American relations at the end of the 1980s, see Victor Bulmer-Thomas 'British 
relations with Latin America into the 1990s', in Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), 
Britain and Latin America: a changing relationship (London, 1989), pp. 205-29. 
The present paper builds on some of the themes and arguments developed there. 
7 For brief historical accounts, see D. C. M. Piatt, 'British Diplomacy 
in Latin America since Emancipation', Inter-American Economic Affairs, vol. 
21, no. 3 (1967); and Leslie Bethell, 'Britain and Latin America in Historical 
Perspective', in Bulmer-Thomas, Britain and Latin America, pp. 1-24; see also 
the more recent work by Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London and New York, 1993). 
8 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism. Crisis and Decon-
struction, 1914-1990 (London and New York, 1993), pp. 146-70. See also John 
Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation. The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War 
World (London, 1988), pp. 3-33. 
collapse of Britain's export trade and the liquidation of its overseas assets 
during the war were decisive, as was the United States' effort to undermine 
the British position. A succession of post-war economic crises further 
ensured the speedy disintegration of Britain's position in Latin America, 
ushering in a period of US hegemony. With US exports soaring, Britain's 
share in the Latin American market had, by 1950, declined to half its pre-war 
level. In subsequent decades it would decline even further.9 
To be sure, important commercial and financial interests remained. And 
concerned individuals periodically argued the need for Britain to reassess its 
attitudes towards the continent. Victor Perowne, head of the Foreign Office's 
South American Department, was the author of a 1945 internal document 
entitled 'The Importance of Latin America'.10 One of Perowne's arguments 
for a return to Latin America was the abundant availability of raw materials, 
a point picked up some five years later by the MP Peter Smithers who argued 
that 'the twin pillars of our policy towards Latin America should.. .be, first, 
to endeavour to fortify the position of those Republics as members of the free 
community of nations, and, second, to increase our trade and commerce with 
them'.11 Yet different governments seemed slow to act on such advice. 
Part of the problem, as a 1952 British trade mission to five countries in the 
region confirmed, was that the conditions prevailing in Latin American 
markets in the post-war period were quite different from those to which 
Britain had previously been accustomed.12 Other industrialised countries like 
West Germany and Japan were far more successful in restoring their Latin 
American trade levels - so successful that Britain soon slipped from being the 
region's third to its fourth most important trading partner. The findings of the 
Crosland Mission may have led to 'a clearer understanding of trends which 
were general throughout Latin America',13 but this was not translated into 
any effective policy that produced dividends in the short term. As one 
9 The impact of the Second World War is discussed in Bethell, 'Britain 
and Latin America in Historical Perspective', pp. 18-20 and Miller, Britain and 
Latin America, pp. 222-5. 
10 See Robert Graham, 'British Policy towards Latin America', in Bulmer-
Thomas, Britain and Latin America, pp. 53-4. 
11 See 'Latin America (British interests)', Parliamentary Debates. House 
of Commons (475), London, 1950, 2420. 
12 The trade mission, led by Brigadier W.H. Crosland, visited Venezuela, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Mexico. See George Pendle, 
'Latin America', in Peter Calvocoressi (ed.), Survey of International Affairs 
1953 (London, 1956), p. 363. 
13 Ibid., p. 364. 
speaker in a 1972 House of Lords debate on Latin America and the United 
Kingdom lamented, 'by the 1950s...Britain had very little left in Latin 
America, except immense good will'.14 
Arguably, even that 'good will' was in short supply: in Argentina the 
nationalist regime of Peron was in place by 1946.15 Other South American 
republics, quick to perceive the limited interest, as well as the greatly limited 
capacity, of the British government in its dealings with them had turned 
increasingly to the United States. There was little sympathy, furthermore, for 
Britain's stern action in Georgetown in 1953,16 sounding a note of warning 
not only about the future of British Guiana (Guyana) but also Britain's two 
other remaining colonies in the region: the Falkland Islands and British 
Honduras (Belize). The British Government, for its part, had other more 
pressing concerns. As Lord Gore Booth, another speaker in the 1972 House 
of Lords debate observed: 'with withdrawal from Empire, problems with 
Eastern Europe, relations with Western Europe and all those other problems 
crowding in on Ministers, week after week, year after year, it has been very 
difficult to give Latin America the priority which many people would have 
wished'.17 
There were, of course, a number of occasions on which Britain's generally 
flagging interests in Latin America underwent at least a partial revival. The 
interest aroused in Europe by the Cuban revolution, for example, occasioned 
such a revival in the mid-1960s. While Britain did not entirely share the 
United States's rather stark Cold-War vision of the world, nor its commit-
ment to containing communism worldwide - as its reaction to events in Cuba 
14 See Earl Cowley's speech in 'Latin America and the United Kingdom', 
Parliamentary Debates. Lords (327), London, 1972, p. 334. 
15 See C. A. MacDonald, 'The United States, Britain and Argentina in the 
Years immediately after the Second World War \ in G. di Telia and D. C. M. 
Piatt (eds.), The Political Economy of Argentina, 1880-1946 (Basingstoke, 
1986). For Peron's nationalist programme, and British reactions to it, see J. G. 
Lomax (Overseas Economic Surveys), Argentina. Economic and Commercial 
Conditions in the Argentine Republic (London, 1948). Concerns of Latin 
American 'latent animosity' towards the United Kingdom were raised in an 
address at Chatham House by J. A. Camacho in 1958; see his 'Latin America 
and the English-speaking World', International Affairs, vol. 35, no. 1 (January 
1959), pp. 24-32. 
16 In Guyana (then British Guiana), the constitution was suspended and 
subsequently revised following the electoral success of the People's Progressive 
Party. Pendle, 'Latin America', pp. 358-9. 
17 'Latin America and the United Kingdom', p. 363. 
itself showed18 - the Castro revolution nonetheless excited curiosity and 
concern, and a desire to learn more about Latin American politics and 
society. 
As a result of this new-found curiosity a Committee 'to consider the 
further development of Latin American studies in the Universities' was 
created in 1962. The Committee, which was chaired by Dr J.H. Parry, 
produced in August 1964 a lengthy report which found that: 'The state of 
Latin American studies in British universities entirely fails to reflect the 
economic, political and cultural importance of Latin America.' Its recom-
mendations included inter alia the promotion of Spanish and Portuguese 
language teaching at schools and universities and the establishment of Centres 
of Latin American Studies at selected British universities where 'a tradition 
of Latin American studies already exists'.19 Five such centres were duly 
created, forming the backbone of teaching and research on Latin America, 
while a number of related developments also helped to raise the profile of 
Latin America in Britain: the expansion in 1964 of Reuters' Latin American 
press service, the introduction in 1967 of a Spanish language version of The 
Economist, and the appearance in 1969 of the Journal of Latin American 
Studies.20 
Interest in the state of British-Latin American relations stemmed not only 
from official quarters. Since the 1970s, a proliferation of different pressure 
groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were active in trying to 
raise Latin America's profile in Britain and to expose pressing social, 
economic and political problems in Latin American societies.21 
18 Britain did not, for example follow the USA in imposing a trade 
embargo on Cuba in 1960, nor did it subsequently attempt to constrain trade 
relations. See David Thomas, 'The United States factor in British relations with 
Latin America', in Bulmer-Thomas, Britain and Latin America, p. 70. 
19 University Grants Committee, Report on the Committee on Latin 
American Studies (London, 1964), pp. v, 1-2. 
20 See also Gerald Martin, 'Britain's cultural relations with Latin 
America', in Bulmer-Thomas, Britain and Latin America, pp. 35-6; Herbert 
Goldhamer, The Foreign Powers in Latin America (Princeton, 1972), pp. 142-3. 
21 The London-based Latin America Bureau, for example, was established 
in 1977. Concerned with human rights and related social, political and economic 
issues, it initiated a series of publications on Britain, and later Europe and Latin 
America. These publications were designed to 'increase public awareness of the 
continent', and to promote government policies which would 'assist and not 
hinder the changes necessary in the political, economic and social structures of 
Latin America'. See Britain and Latin America. Annual Review of British-Latin 
American Relations (1978) (London, 1978 and 1979); and Europe and Latin 
Alongside educational and cultural measures came a set of economic and 
political initiatives reflecting also a desire on the part of the British 
government to recover something of its former position in South America. In 
1966, some thirteen years after the Crosland Mission had highlighted the 
need for Britain to adjust its export policy to Latin America's requirements, 
Foreign Secretary Sir Michael Stewart visited the region as part of the 
Labour government's policy of promoting exports. Two years later, there 
was a royal visit - by the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh - to Brazil and 
Chile, still recalled in old photographs in discreet hotels tucked away in 
Chile's lake district. In 1972 there was evidence also of a renewed political 
offensive, marked in January by the House of Lords debate on Latin America 
and the United Kingdom, and in May by a seminar on Latin America 
organised by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at Lancaster House. The 
latter, according to Robert Graham, marked the 'coming of age of Latin 
America in official British thinking'.22 
Yet the results of the Lancaster House meeting, like those of the Latin 
American offensive generally, did not meet expectations. As Sir Robert 
Marett, a participant at the conference, observed, 'perhaps more significant 
than what was actually said at this Conference was the eminence of the 
speakers who addressed it'.23 He went on 'what came out clearly from the 
discussions was the firm determination of the Latin Americans to secure a 
better deal for themselves in world trade'. The mood of economic nationalism 
that had grown throughout the region since the Second World War - a mood 
that was reflected at a collective level in the greater assertiveness displayed 
by the Third World in different international fora24 - was certainly one of 
many obstacles that hindered the government's diplomatic and commercial 
initiative. Also damaging were the consequences of the 1973 oil price rises. 
Meanwhile with Britain focusing attention more firmly on the European 
stage, efforts to improve trade links with the four most important economies 
of the region, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, petered out. The 
displacement of Argentina from its position as Britain's most important Latin 
American supplier - it first fell behind Venezuela, then behind Brazil and 
America (London, 1980). 
22 Robert Graham, 'British policy towards Latin America', in Bulmer-
Thomas, Britain and Latin America, p. 59. For an official account of what at the 
time appeared to be a renewed interest in Latin America, see Reference 
Division, Central Office of Information (ed.), Gran Bretana y la America Latina 
(London, 1972). 
23 Sir Robert Marett, Latin America: British Trade and Investment 
(London, 1973), pp. 226-7. 
24 On this theme see Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International 
Relations (Princeton, 1987), especially Chapter 7. 
Chile also - was symptomatic of this general decline. Indeed, as Laurence 
Whitehead notes, in the 1970s commercial interchange between the two areas 
had, in relative terms, fallen 'to the lowest level since the days of Iberian 
mercantilism'.25 To many the situation seemed irreversible. In one study in 
1973, Alec Nove pessimistically concluded: 'Plainly there is no likelihood of 
Great Britain ever again becoming a major trading and investment partner for 
Latin America.'26 Subsequent developments would do nothing to contradict 
this impression. Indeed the consequences of the Falklands War in 1982 and 
the onset of the debt crisis added a decidedly negative image to British 
perceptions of the continent, making the prospects for any new British-Latin 
American relationship ever more distant. 
Trade and investment figures for the period 1950-1986 provide the most 
eloquent evidence of this steady decline. In 1950 the Latin American market 
accounted for 7.1% of British exports, in 1970 3.5% and in 1986, a mere 
1.4%. Similarly, Britain absorbed a sharply diminishing share of Latin 
American exports: 7.8% in 1950, 3.7% in 1970 and 1.5% in 1986. With 
regard to investments, between 1930 and 1962, Latin America's share of 
Britain's total overseas investments fell dramatically from 35 % to 3.8 %. And 
despite some fluctuation in the two following decades, the figure for the early 
1980s was similar. Perhaps most striking was the change in the location of 
British overseas investments: by 1981 not only the United States, Europe and 
Canada, Australia and South Africa combined, but also Asia and Africa had 
overtaken Latin America as the principal sites of UK overseas investment.27 
In the forty or so years between the end of the Second World War and the 
end of the Cold War all the evidence suggests that Latin America had become 
increasingly marginal to British interests. Despite the intermittent economic 
and political initiatives of different governments and the urgent prompting of 
concerned individuals, the pattern of relations in this period wavered between 
abandonment and indifference. Only certain developments in the area of 
cultural relations appeared to contradict this general trend, such as the 
foundation in 1943 of the Hispanic and Luso-Brazilian Council - today 
25 Laurence Whitehead, 'Britain's Economic Relations with Latin 
America', in J. Grunwald (ed.), Latin America in the International Economy 
(Washington, 1978), p. 77. 
26 Alec Nove, 'Great Britain and Latin American Economic Develop-
ment', in V.L. Urquidi and R. Thorp (eds.), Latin America in the International 
Economy (London, 1973), p. 77. 
27 See David Atkinson, 'Trade, aid and investment since 1950', in 
Bulmer-Thomas, Britain and Latin America, pp. 104-17. 
known as Canning House28 - and the establishment of the different centres 
of Latin American studies recommended by the Parry Report (see above). 
Other institutions were to embark on similar ventures in the following years. 
All this has amounted to an impressive academic infrastructure and stimulated 
the research and training of an array of specialists in diverse fields of Latin 
American studies. In a study on Britain's cultural relations with Latin 
America, Gerald Martin noted that the 'volume and quality of research and 
publication on Latin America... is remarkably high and stands comparison 
with that from any comparable country'.29 There were some very practical 
limitations to this cultural and educational offensive, mainly of a financial 
nature, and Victor Bulmer-Thomas draws the distinction between official 
relations, maintained on a 'shoestring' budget, and unofficial relations which 
were 'quite healthy'.30 It is nonetheless somewhat paradoxical that Britain's 
cultural and educational efforts to promote Latin American links came at a 
time when its political and economic relationship had reached an all time low. 
For a country involved in redefining its global interests there is no 
necessary contradiction in retaining a strong cultural and intellectual interest 
in areas where a physical presence has been all but abandoned. And there was 
also a feeling, sometimes expressed in official as well as unofficial circles, 
that Britain's moment in Latin America might return. Indeed, one of the 
achievements of an institution like Canning House, whose original motivation 
had been to re-establish some of Britain's traditional commercial links in 
Latin America, has been 'to maintain interest in this field despite the failure 
of government and industry to develop a constructive and continuing policy 
towards British economic involvement in the continent'.31 
Such considerations aside, some distancing of Britain and Latin America 
after 1930 was, in many respects, inevitable. Changes both at the domestic 
and international level help to explain why the two took such widely 
divergent paths. The Second World War and its consequences displaced 
Britain from its great power status, drastically reducing its ability to act on 
the broader international stage. Outside the United States and Europe, Britain 
now focused more narrowly on the countries of the Commonwealth and the 
Middle East, where a significant presence was retained East of Suez until the 
28 For a survey of the work and achievements of Canning House see 
Nicholas Bowen, A History of Canning House (London, 1979). 
29 Gerald Martin, 'Britain's cultural relations with Latin America', in 
Bulmer-Thomas, Britain and Latin America, pp. 27-51. 
30 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, 'British relations with Latin America into the 
1990s', in ibid, pp. 218-20. 
31 Bowen, History of Canning House, p. 23. 
early 1970s.32 Further, the need to fortify the 'special' - if now highly 
unequal - relationship with the United States, on whom Britain came so 
heavily to depend in the post-war period, implied a dovetailing of interests 
in a region which was after all now peripheral to its international con-
cerns.33 Even if Britain did not always follow the US line, as the Cuban case 
demonstrated, on no occasion during the Cold War did Britain seriously 
question the pretensions of the Monroe Doctrine. And Britain was duly 
rewarded by US support in the Falklands/Malvinas crisis, despite the obvious 
difficulties this raised for US relations with Latin America. In similar 
fashion, although this time in a Caribbean rather than Latin American 
context, Margaret Thatcher's uneasiness over the US invasion of Grenada in 
1983, in particular her bitterness over the 'lack of consultation', was soon 
overcome.34 The price of opposition to such a move was simply judged to 
be too high.35 
1985-1995: decade of rediscovery? 
At first sight, as the above account suggests, the prospects for any improve-
ment in British Latin American relations in the 1980s and beyond appeared 
bleak. UK investment in the region, as well as trade between Britain and 
Latin America, had become relatively insignificant. The debt crisis had 
further damaged the image of Latin America among British businessmen. 
And the war in the South Atlantic added another barrier to the relationship. 
As late as 1988, in welcoming a 'long overdue' debate on Latin America in 
32 See W.R. Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1935-1951 
(Oxford, 1984). 
33 On the special relationship in this period see Bradford Perkins, 
'Unequal Partners: The Truman Administration and Great Britain', in W.R. 
Louis and Hedley Bull (eds.), The Special Relationship. Anglo-American 
Relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986), pp. 43-64; see also David Reynolds, 
'Rethinking Anglo-American Relations', International Affairs, vol. 65 (1989), 
pp. 89-111. 
34 The embarrassment of the government was clearly exposed when 
Geoffrey Howe, having told MPs on 24 October 1983 that he had 'no reason to 
think that American military intervention is likely', was obliged to reveal only 
the following day that US troops had, in fact, landed on the island. Parliamen-
tary Debates, Hansard (47), London 1983: 30, 143. 
35 Thomas, 'The United States factor', pp. 78-9; for a discussion of US-
British relations in Latin America in the late Cold War period, see also William 
D. Rogers, 'The Unspecial Relationship in Latin America', in Louis and Bull, 
The Special Relationship, pp. 340-53. 
the House of Commons, Jacques Arnold MP complained that 'so often 
foreign affairs debates in this place centre strategically on East-West 
relations, fashionably on Europe, nostalgically on the Commonwealth and 
indifferently on the remainder'.36 Yet this picture of indifference had 
already begun to change. As Tim Sainsbury, Undersecretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, declared in July 1989, British-Latin American relations had 
started to gain 'momentum'.37 
In this section we examine the various 'signs of rediscovery' which lend 
support to the argument that British relations with Latin America have 
experienced a period of renewal during the last decade. We look, among 
other issues, at the higher profile given to the region in Westminster, the 
increasing interest shown towards Latin America within governmental 
circles, and the stronger economic ties developed in the 1990s. We also look 
at the significance of some bilateral relationships and at the role of the United 
Kingdom in multilateral diplomacy in the region. But before turning to these 
'signs of rediscovery', let us briefly consider, first, how the conflict in the 
South Atlantic gave a paradoxical impetus to British-Latin American 
relations, and second, how changing perceptions of Latin America's process 
of political and economic reform conditioned UK renewed interest in the 
continent. 
The war with Argentina, while initially appearing to weaken further what 
was already a fragile and limited relationship, helped to provide a new 
dimension to British policy.38 For all the short term disruption it caused, the 
conflict was to stimulate a new diplomatic offensive designed to limit the 
damage done to Britain's position in the continent. Geoffrey Howe's visits to 
Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia and Mexico between 1984 and 1987 should be 
seen in this light. His was a remarkable agenda for a British Foreign 
Secretary, given that only two such visits - by Michael Stewart in 1966 and 
Lord Carrington in 1980 - had hitherto been made in the entire postwar 
period. The extent to which the Falkland/Malvinas islands question features 
in the British relationship with Latin America as a whole may be open to 
debate.39 In any case, by the mid-1980s, the issue had diminished in 
importance. Moreover by the end of the decade, British relations with 
Argentina seemed to be entering into a new phase, a 'period of tangible 
36 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (138), London, 1988: 708. 
37 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (157), London, 1989: 1329. 
38 Robert Graham, 'British policy towards Latin America', p. 65. 
39 See, for example, comments by Jacques Arnold and Ray Whitney 
during the 1988 House of Commons debate, in Parliamentary Debates. Hansard 
(138), London, 28 July 1988: 709 and 718. 
achievement', as forecast in Parliament by Tim Sainsbury on 27 July 
1989.40 
Similarly, the debt crisis, despite its potentially serious implications for 
British banks which had lent considerable amounts to Latin American 
countries, proved less damaging than feared. Of course the debt problem 
discouraged even further British confidence on the economies of the region. 
Nevertheless, as the Brady plan was being implemented and, above all, as the 
signs of economic progress became visible, the government acknowledged 
that Latin America was 'beginning to emerge from the debt crisis'.41 
What provided the real incentive to Britain to cultivate new ties with the 
region were the profound political and economic changes experienced by 
Latin America during the 1980s - the twin processes of political 
democratisation and economic liberalisation, dubbed the 'quiet revolution' 
by Minister Tristan Garel-Jones, among others.42 These reforms created a 
more favourable environment for UK-Latin American relations. They 
encouraged a new perception of Latin American reality. 'Latin America, lost 
and found' , declared The Financial Times in the spring of 1992, sentiments 
that were shared elsewhere in the British media.43 Rather than being 
dismissed as the 'lost decade', the 1980s were now characterised as a period 
where change and upheaval have given way to quiet progress and consolida-
tion of economic and political reform. 
These positive, even 'euphoric' perceptions were tempered by a gloomy 
mood following the Mexican crisis of December 1994. However, the region 
seems to have overcome the worst of the crisis - a 'quick' recovery 'from 
what was undoubtedly a serious shock', in the words of Ray Whitney.44 Not 
all countries were equally affected, a point recurrently raised by the British 
media. 'As the process of genuine economic reform establishes i t se l f , a 
recent survey in The Economist stressed, 'Latin America's diversity is 
40 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (157), London, 27 July 1989: 1328. 
41 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (138), London, 28 July 1988: 725. 
42 Tristan Garel-Jones, 'Latin America: the Quiet Revolution', in Oxford 
International Institute, Latin America - Recovery, Investment and Growth (Bath 
and Oxford, 1991), p. 7. 
43 The Financial Times, 27 March 1992; see also 'Latins ride high', The 
Economist, 18 July 1992, and 'Latin American promise', The Times, 9 August 
1993. 
44 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (264), London, 18 October 1995:271. 
increasing'.45 Furthermore, in spite of its shortcomings, there seems to 
prevail an impression that the profound economic reforms are here to stay, 
and that the foundations for economic development are now more solid than 
in the early 1980s. 
The extraordinary optimism of the early 1990s was also tempered by 
security problems in the region, particularly by border disputes between Peru 
and Ecuador, and to a lesser extent between Venezuela and Colombia.46 In 
addition, doubts about the solidity and durability of democracy are widely 
expressed. So too are concerns about the role of the military. Further, the 
weak judicial systems and the widespread corruption that prevail in many 
countries must be set against the achievements of a reform movement whose 
benefits are still to be felt by the poorest sectors of the population. 
There prevails nonetheless a mood of greater optimism about Latin 
America's prospects. Admittedly, the 'widespread euphoria' of the early 
1990s, as Moises Nairn has pointed out, has 'vanished'. But the prospects are 
far from gloomy. In Nairn's own words: 'after the hangover, a more sober, 
realistic view is already beginning to emerge'.47 Within British official 
circles, this view was still a positive one by the end of 1995. 'The United 
Kingdom remains confident that Mexico specifically and Latin America as a 
whole have laid the basis for an increasingly prosperous and stable future', 
Sir Nicholas Bonsor told Parliament on 18 October 1995.48 The previously 
cited critical survey by The Economist concluded on a cautious yet optimistic 
note about the continent's future.49 
All in all, the ongoing process of reform has also meant that politically, 
economically and culturally, Latin America - in sharp contrast to some other 
45 'Still Volatile: A Survey of Latin American Finance', The Economist, 
9 December 1995, p. 4. 
46 For an example of recent concerns, see 'Latin America's Frontier 
Alarms', The Economist, 20 January 1996. Such conflicts aside, the prevailing 
and indeed favourable image of the region, and of the inter-American system 
generally, remains one of a zone of peace or a 'Kantian pacific union of liberal 
states'. See, for example, Mark Peceny, 'The Inter-American System as a 
Liberal "Pacific Union"?', Latin American Research Review, vol. 29, no. 3 
(1994), pp. 188-201. 
47 Moises Nairn, 'Latin America the Morning After', Foreign Affairs, 
July-August, 1995, p. 61. 
48 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard{264), London, 18 October 1995:279. 
49 See footnote 45. 
regions of the world - has been brought closer to the West, a fact that has not 
been lost on British and European policy makers. 'Our policy towards Latin 
America will increasingly be seen in a European context', declared Donald 
Anderson MP, in the 1989 House of Commons debate on Latin America. One 
year later Lord Thomas referred to Latin America as 'a department of 
European culture'.50 This was a far cry from Earl Cowley's reference in 
1972 to Latin America as 'an area of the world where European concepts and 
ideas do not really apply'.51 Certainly from the perspective of the 1990s, 
compared with the pitfalls and uncertainties of Middle Eastern or African 
politics (the Islamic threat is but one example52), Latin America appears 
relatively reassuring. These new British perceptions of Latin American 
realities have been accompanied by a higher profile of Latin American issues 
in Westminster, a stronger interest on the region in governmental circles and, 
more significantly, closer economic ties. Let us turn briefly to each of these 
points. 
The institutionalisation of an annual Latin American debate in the House 
of Commons is an innovation worthy of note. On 28 July 1988 the first in a 
series of such debates was held, providing a formal opportunity to discuss the 
government's policies towards the region.53 The Commons' Latin American 
debate has since become a regular event taking place usually in July, although 
often at a time of night unlikely to attract the attention of more than a handful 
of MPs.54 While the establishment of its own debate does not in any way 
mean that Latin America has suddenly gained importance at the expense of 
Britain's other traditional areas of interest, it is nonetheless a significant 
development and represents a break with the past. It has also become possible 
50 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (157), London, 27 July 1989: 1323; 
Parliamentary Debates. Lords (524), London, 19 December 1990: 846. 
51 Parliamentary Debates. Lords (327), London, 26 January 1972: 334. 
52 'The Islamic resurgence in Asia, the Middle-East and North Africa will 
be particularly challenging', in Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p. 306. 
53 Since 1988 eight such debates have taken place, the last one in October 
1995. See Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (138), London, 28 July 1988: 708-
728; (157) 22 July 1989: 1312-1329; (170), 32 July 1990: 248-262; (177), 22 
July 1991: 841-862; (210), 9 July 1992: 585-603; (211), 26 July 1993: 817-837; 
(229), 20 July 1994: 453-470; and (264), 18 October 1995: 263-284. 
54 The 1988 and 1898 debates started well after midnight, those between 
1990 and 1993 at a more civilised early evening hour; the 1994 debate again at 
1:30 a.m., and the most recent one (in October 1995) at 10:40 a.m. See above 
references from 1989-1995; see also Victor Bulmer-Thomas, 'Britain and Latin 
America: Closer in the 1990s?', The World Today, vol. 45, no. 11 (1989), p. 
198 
to identify a core of MPs who feature prominently in the above debates, and 
who regularly concern themselves with Latin American issues: Conservatives 
Jacques Arnold, Ray Whitney and John Wilkinson, and the Labour MPs 
Jeremy Corbyn and Tony Lloyd, among others, have all visited the continent 
and follow its development closely. Under the chairmanship of Ray Whitney 
an umbrella British-Latin American parliamentary group has been formed 
which holds an annual parliamentary seminar at Canning House, and hosts 
visits to Parliament of high officials from Latin America. Some MPs have 
started to move away from the old stereotypes in discussing Britain and Latin 
America, although the common references to Bolivar, Lord Cochrane or 
Canning remain - appearing as simple attempts to fill a vacuum of appropri-
ate knowledge of the continent. 
If, as Victor Bulmer-Thomas has suggested, the number of official visits 
is a good indicator of British commitment to a particular region,55 then Latin 
America has certainly gained priority in government circles. Minister Tristan 
Garel-Jones's 14 visits to the continent between August 1990 and May 1992 
may have been something of a record, but even Foreign Secretary Geoffrey 
Howe's relatively crowded Latin American agenda had already broken with 
a previous pattern of neglect. Howe's successor, Douglas Hurd, showed no 
intention of reversing the trend towards intensifying diplomatic relations, as 
his own visits to Mexico, Chile and Argentina showed. In his last four years 
as Foreign Secretary, Hurd made three trips to the region, visiting several 
countries. Overall the number of high-level visits to Latin America has 
increased sharply in recent years. In 1989 nine ministers visited Latin 
America compared with 22 in 1993. Peter Lilley, Kenneth Clarke, Michael 
Heseltine and Michael Howard are among those who have made at least one 
visit to the continent.56 
Amid this increasing official interest, the continuing failure of a British 
55 Bulmer-Thomas, 'Britain and Latin America: closer in the 1990s?', p. 
200. 
56 For example: as Secretary of State for Trade, Peter Lilley visited 
Venezuela in 1991; Kenneth Clarke visited Mexico as Secretary of State for 
Education, and Venezuela, Colombia and Peru as Home Secretary in 1992; 
Michael Howard visited Brazil as Secretary for the Environment in 1992; and 
Michael Heseltine visited Mexico and Argentina as President of the Board of 
Trade in 1993. 'Ministerial visits to Latin America', FCO, American Section, 
Research and Analysis Department, 13 November 1992; Parliamentary Debates. 
Hansard (229), London, 20 July 1994:465. This contrasts with Lord Greenhill 
of Harrow's recollections of his experience in the Foreign Office: 'it was always 
difficult to interest ministers in South America'; Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 
London, 1991:838. 
prime minister to visit the region was seen as 'an extraordinary omission' .57 
MP Jacques Arnold in the 1989 debate on Latin America urged the Prime 
Minister to make such a visit, claiming that it 'would make a major impact' 
in a region where the Government's economic policies had excited great 
interest.58 In both practical and symbolic terms therefore, John Major's visit 
to Colombia in June 1992 prior to his attendance at the environment summit 
in Rio de Janeiro - part of an extensive programme of overseas travel that the 
Prime Minister embarked on during his first two or so years in power59 -
was of particular significance. Since Major's visit the trend has continued. 
In July 1993 Treasury Minister Michael Portillo headed a commercial 
mission to Chile, one of a 'glittering array' of ministers to travel across Latin 
America in 1993-94 in what was described as 'another good year for Latin 
America and in particular for Britain's relations with it'.60 Leading a trade 
mission in September 1995, the Minister of Trade and Technology Ian Taylor 
became 'the first senior official from London to visit Cuba in 20 years'.61 
In January 1996 the Chancellor Kenneth Clarke visited Brazil 'to find out 
more about its privatisation programme', accompanied by British bankers and 
representatives from the UK's privatised utilities. And in April, Malcolm 
Rifkind, Foreign Secretary, visited Mexico and Argentina.62 Of course the 
flow of official visits has not been only in one direction. In contrast to the 
limited exchanges of earlier decades, the 1990s have seen a parallel increase 
in the number of visits made by Latin American presidents to London. The 
period 1990-1996 has seen visits to the UK by Mexican, Brazilian, Chilean, 
Peruvian, Uruguayan, Paraguayan and Colombian heads of state.63 
At the ministerial level, foremost among those who have made a significant 
contribution to the promotion of British-Latin American relations is Tristan 
57 Bulmer-Thomas, 'Britain and Latin America', p. 200. 
58 Parliamentary Debates, Hansard (157), London, 27 July 1989: 1321. 
59 Martin Gilbert, 'Globe-trotting Major keeps the lion roaring', The 
Times, 13 July 1993. 
60 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (162), London, 20 July 1994. 
61 'Britons head for Cuba as Marx gives way to the market', The Times, 
21 January 1995. See also 'UK business wants our man in Havana' and 'Cubans 
bullish over UK trade delegation visit' in The Financial Times, 25 May and 10 
September 1994 
62 The Financial Times, 8 January and 12 April 1996. 
63 'Visits by Latin American Presidents to UK', FCO, American Section, 
Research and Analysis Department, 3 March 1993; also various newspaper 
clippings. 
Garel-Jones, former Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office. A fluent Spanish speaker, Garel-Jones visited the continent extensive-
ly while in office. In Douglas Hurd's words he was a man who was 
'extremely difficult to distract in any way from the affairs of Latin Amer-
ica'.64 More importantly, to Garel-Jones can be attributed the impetus 
behind the decision to reverse the process of winding down Britain's presence 
in Latin America. As he later recorded: 
Who decides? Ministers do. When I arrived at King Charles Street, the 
British Government was putting the final touches to winding down our 
presence in Latin America. I was determined to stop and reverse this 
process, so my private secretary pointed me in the direction of the 
planners... They took up the task with relish. A paper was produced within 
a few months; a submission went to the Secretary of State, who agreed 
with it. Resources were redirected. Britain, I hope rightly, began to take 
this continent seriously again for the first time in nearly 100 years.65 
Garel-Jones may be overstretching the point. But there is no doubt, as the 
records show, that the region has been given a higher profile in British 
official circles during the last decade. As in the past, this renewed interest is 
based foremost on economic considerations: 'the driving force for Britain's 
involvement in the region ... was, and still is, trade and investment', Sir 
Nicholas Bonsor, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
has pointed out.66 The Mexican crisis in December 1994 did not deter the 
British government from launching its 'Link into Latin America' campaign 
the following month, a campaign to promote business links with the region 
in close association with the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). Since 
its launch, on 17 January 1995, more than 30 events have been organised 
with the attendance of more than 1,200 UK companies and representative 
bodies.67 
64 'Latin America: an essential part of the new world order', Foreign 
Secretary's speech at Canning House, 30 October 1990. 
65 Tristan Garel-Jones, 'BBC dispels "chinless" image of Diplomatic 
Service', The Independent, 30 April 1994. 
66 Nicholas Bonsor, Britain and Latin America: Economic Prospects, 
Institute of Latin American Studies Occasional Paper No. 13 (London, 1996). 
67 See Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (264), London, 18 October 1995: 
281-2; and Department of Trade and Industry, 'Link into Latin America. Your 
Next Big Market', 1995. The campaign was referred to as 'a partnership 
between government and the private sector [and] underlines the UK's long-term 
commitment to strengthening ties and developing trade links with Latin America 
and to re-establishing a strong role for British business in the region'; in 'Speech 
for the Minister of Trade to give as a welcoming address at the CBI-hosted 
Foreign investment was attracted to Latin America in the past decade by 
the more favourable attitude towards foreign capital now prevailing 
throughout the continent - a far cry from the nationalistic stance of earlier 
years. To further encourage investors' confidence, the British government 
has signed Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements with several 
Latin American countries, including Brazil and Colombia in 1994, and Cuba 
in 1995.68 In 1990 Douglas Hurd highlighted the importance of Latin 
America's share in Britain's overseas investments, then estimated at more 
than £10 billion: 'Bilaterally, we are one of the biggest overseas investors... 
we are the second largest investor in Mexico, Chile, and maybe others... We 
were the biggest overseas investor in Colombia in 1989.'69 In 1995, 
according to the President of the Inter-American Development Bank, within 
the European Union the United Kingdom was the foremost investor in 
MERCOSUR countries: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.70 'Better 
off and back in fashion' and 'Investment pours back into Latin America', 
read the titles of two press articles in the early 1990s, setting the tone for 
what appears to have been a steady increase in British investments to the 
region.71 Particularly prominent is the presence of British direct investment 
in Latin America: in 1993 UK direct investment in the region, including the 
Caribbean, was estimated to be £12.2 billion.72 
MERCOSUR conference on 21 September 1995'. The calendar of events for 
1996 includes mission visits to practically all Latin American countries; DTI, 
'Link into Latin America: Calendar of Events, January 1996-1997'. 
68 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (264), London, 25 October 1995:656 
and 1015; and Prime Minister's Speech at Canning House, 'The United Kingdom 
and Latin America', 11 March 1994. 
69 Douglas Hurd, 'Latin America: an essential part of the new world 
order', 30 October 1990, Verbatim service, VS056/90. 
70 'Statement by Enrique V. Iglesias, President of the Inter-American 
Development Bank', MERCOSUR Conference, Confederation of British 
Industry, London, 21 September 1995. 'During the 1990-93 period, UK foreign 
direct investment flows to the four MERCOSUR member countries amounted to 
a total of US$ 983 million, according to OECD data', in ibid. 
71 The commentary accompanying the UK annual investment figures for 
1992 notes that the 'largest increase in investment was in the rest of the world 
sector, mainly developing countries... due in the main to increased investment 
in the Far East, particularly Hong Kong and Singapore, and also in South 
America and the Caribbean.' Business Monitor M4, Overseas Transactions 
(London: HMSO, 1993), p. 5. 
72 'UK direct investment: book value of net assets' (in current prices), in 
Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (255), London, 24 February 1995: 367-8. See 
also Bonsor, 'Britain and Latin America'. 
British capital has been invested in various areas of Latin American 
economies, but perhaps most intensely in the production of minerals, in 
infrastructure and in utilities. It has also made inroads in countries where 
hitherto its presence had been limited. Such is the case of Colombia, where 
British Petroleum (BP) is developing an ambitious programme. In addition, 
BP continues to develop its operations in other Latin American countries, 
such as Venezuela and Mexico. Indeed, John Browne, Managing Director of 
BP, singled out the importance of the region 'to the world's energy 
balance'.73 The interest in new partners has not meant the neglect of 
traditional ones, such as Mexico, Argentina or Brazil. In October 1995, the 
UK investment programme in Brazil was said to be worth £1.93 billion.74 
The ambitious privatisation programme underway in Argentina has also 
attracted British capital, although Britain still lags behind Spain and France 
in this respect, its historical connections notwithstanding. British Gas 
however is a major shareholder in the distribution of gas in Buenos Aires, 
and since 1990 Thames Water has been involved in the Argentine water 
industry. Other British firms - BAT, ICI, Glaxo and Unilever for example 
- have also been active participants in the development of Argentine 
industry.75 In Chile, where British capital has perhaps been slower in 
responding to the new economic opportunities, companies like British Gas, 
Rolls-Royce and British Steel have nonetheless shown an interest in the trans-
Andean pipeline project.76 
While it is clearly possible to identify an increased flow of British capital 
towards Latin America, the overall trade picture has been far slower to 
improve. In 1989 Britain's share of Latin American imports still hovered 
around a mere 1.4 %. In 1990 however the downward spiral in commercial 
relations which had characterised earlier decades seemed finally to have 
reversed with the release of figures that suggested a 23.2 % increase in British 
73 See John Browne, 'Latin American Oil in an International Context', 
lecture delivered at Canning House on 4 November 1993. 
74 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (264), London, 25 October 1995: 
1015. 
75 'Argentina whets foreign appetites', The Financial Times, 12 January 
1993; LATAG Bulletin, March-April 1993, p. 20. On British Gas in Argentina, 
see D. Cotrell, 'Business prospects for the near future in MERCOSUR', paper 
delivered at the CBI-hosted MERCOSUR conference, 21 September 1995. 
Indeed the interests of British Gas extend to other MERCOSUR countries, 
including Chile and Bolivia; ibid. 
76 'UK interest in trans-Andean pipeline', The Financial Times, 14 July 
1993. 
exports to the region that year.77 But the benefits of trade liberalisation were 
soon to be somewhat obscured by the effects of Britain's entry into the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the fall in the value of the 
dollar which served to reduce the competitiveness of UK exporters. The 
Brazilian economic crisis did not help matters, while the Department of 
Trade and Industry's ambitious 'Proyecto Venezuela' - an initiative to 
expand trade and investment links between Britain and Venezuela78 -
floundered amid the serious political instability in that country. Yet the 
overall pattern remains one of slow improvement. Significant in this respect 
have been the reestablishment of commercial and diplomatic links with 
Argentina, where the increase in investment noted above has been matched 
by a significant growth in British imports into that country. Colombia and 
Chile, too, stand out as countries where British imports have grown.79 The 
1993 export figures revealed a 27 per cent increase in British exports to the 
region amounting to some £1.7 billion, and this continued upward by 21 per 
cent in 1994 to more than £2 billion. They were up again by a further 20 per 
cent during the first half of 1995, although, as the Minister of State for the 
FCO, Sir Nicholas Bonsor, conceded in the 1995 parliamentary debate, 
Britain's overall market share remained 'disappointingly low': ' 1.7 per cent, 
compared to our share of the world trade which is about 5 per cent'.80 The 
'Link into Latin America' programme, whose results it is still too early to 
judge, was launched precisely to encourage the further development of trade. 
Of course, the 'signs of a rediscovery' in British-Latin American relations 
should not be sought only in trade and investment figures, as a number of 
commentators have noted.81 There are many other criteria, some of which 
77 LATAG Bulletin, London (Autumn 1990), p. 8. 
78 'Caracas visit launches Proyecto Venezuela', LATAG Bulletin, 
November 1991, p. 6. 
79 See the 'Export League Table', 23 April 1993, FCO Circular 165/93; 
see also LATAG Bulletin (March/April 1993), pp. 31-3. 
80 His predecessor had made a similar remark the previous year. See 
Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (162), London, 20 July 1994: 466, and (264), 
18 October 1995: 281. See also Minister of Trade's speech at the MERCOSUR 
conference, London 21 September 1995. In 1992 Britain's share of Latin 
America's imports and exports was 1.4% and 1.1% respectively. The most 
recent 'trade push' into Latin America was marked, in April 1996, by the visit 
to the region of Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind. See 'UK in push for Latin 
American trade', The Financial Times, 12 April 1996. 
81 Bulmer-Thomas, 'British relations with Latin America into the 1990s', 
pp. 205-27; see also Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (138), London, 28 July 
1988: 725 and (177), 22 July 1991: 859. 
we have already referred to, on which to judge the overall pattern of 
relations. The initiation of the annual parliamentary debates on Latin America 
in 1988 have served to illustrate the diversity of themes now the subject of 
concern, as well as - in some cases - their relative novelty: alongside the 
more traditional concerns about trade, development and bilateral relations, 
issues like the environment, drugs, human rights, and 'good government' all 
now feature. And the state of bilateral relations is no longer a sufficient 
measure of the overall condition of British-Latin American relations. 
Britain's relations with Latin America are increasingly conditioned by its 
membership of the European Union, such that one must refer to a European 
rather than a British policy in a number of areas. Indeed it may be often be 
difficult to separate specifically British as opposed to common European 
interests.82 Further, non-governmental organisations alongside a variety of 
pressure groups and other 'non-state actors' have been clearly influential in 
raising the profile of certain issues, notably those relating to the environment 
and human rights. They have had a significant and increasing impact on 
policy both at the bilateral and European Union (EU) level.83 
The environment has at least featured in talks between British and 
Brazilian officials which have resulted in a series of bilateral agreements on 
environmental protection. The opposition, together with various NGOs, is 
often critical of the government's stance towards the environment and, above 
all, human rights. Yet human rights issues have also been raised, for 
example, in the meetings between John Major, other British officials and 
Latin American heads of state including Peru's Fujimori and Brazil's Collor 
de Melo in 1992, and more recently during the visit of Colombian president-
elect Ernesto Samper to London in early 1994.84 According to the govern-
ment, its policy towards human rights - 'now tempered with the knowledge 
82 Wallace, 'British Foreign Policy after the Cold War', pp. 438-9. 
83 Robert Graham, 'British policy towards Latin America', pp. 62-4. For 
a recent survey of EU-Latin American relations, see Christian L. Freres, 
Alberto Van Klaveren and Guadalupe Ruiz-Gimenez, 'Europay America Latina: 
La busqueda de nuevas formas de cooperacion', Sintesis, no. 18 (Sept./Dec. 
1992), pp. 91-178. 
84 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (229), London, 20 July 1994: 466, 
468-9. Government answers to questions in Parliament, usually by the 
opposition, provide evidence of current policies towards human rights. For 
recent statements regarding Brazil see, for example: Parliamentary Debates. 
Hansard (259), London, 2 May 1995: 151; (260), 16 May 1995: 112; (261), 8 
June 1995: 284; (264), 25 October 1995: 1016. On Guatemala, see ibid. (264), 
19 October 1995: 305-6 and (268), 7 December 1995: 341-2. And on Peru: ibid. 
(203), 7 February 1992: 327, and (208), 3 June 1992: 809-10. 
that we are dealing with democratic societies'85 - is tied to the support given 
to those relevant institutions in tackling the problems of law and order in 
Latin America. Such is the government's case for training some police 
forces, including Guatemala's, as expressed by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Sir Nicholas Bonsor in 1995.86 Drugs trafficking has also become 
an increasing area of concern and Britain has lent support, mainly of a 
technical nature, to the Bolivian, Venezuelan and Colombian governments in 
their efforts to curb illegal production and trading.87 In addition, the United 
Kingdom has given support for alternative development and crop substitution 
projects channelled through the United Nations.88 There is evidence, too, of 
more general efforts at government level to structure a 'Latin America 
policy', in line with an overall policy towards Third World countries, based 
on the concept of 'good government' involving binding British aid and 
support to efforts to consolidate democracy within the region. A number of 
ministers have repeatedly stressed the need for a 'deliberate' policy on good 
government, designed to 'reinforce systems of justice and the very backbone 
of a liberal and democratic society'.89 Aid is not as important an element of 
British policy to Latin America as in other areas of the developing world. On 
the one hand, Latin American needs are not considered as crucial as those, 
for example, of Africa. On the other hand, development aid is increasingly 
channelled through multilateral organisations. Nevertheless, aid has become 
significant particularly in connection with the areas of good government, 
human capital and the sustainable development of renewable natural 
resources.90 Of aid administered bilaterally through the Overseas Develop-
85 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (177), London, 22 July 1991: 859-60. 
86 The Minister was replying to the opposition's concerns about the 
training of police forces in Guatemala, in view of this country's record of human 
right abuses. See Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (264), London, 18 October 
1995: 279. For a radical critique of British policy towards human rights, 
although mostly in relation to the military regimes of the 1970s (namely that of 
Pinochet in Chile), see M. Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power. British Foreign 
Policy since 1945 (London and New Jersey, 1995). Although only recently 
published, this work takes very little account of political developments in Latin 
America in the 1980s and 1990s. 
87 'Drugs, rainforests and UK aid policy', LATAG Bulletin, Summer 1990, 
p. 6. 
88 In 1995, according to official sources, the United Kingdom was the 
second biggest donor to such programmes in the United Nations. See Parliamen-
tary Debates. Hansard (263), London, 4 July 1995: 124-5. 
89 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (117), London, 22 July 1991: 859-61; 
see also Garel-Jones, 'Latin America: the Quiet Revolution', p. 8. 
90 See Bonsor, 'Britain and Latin America'. 
ment Administration (ODA), Latin America in 1970 accounted for a mere 
£2. lm of a total £275m, the Commonwealth still being the primary recipient 
of overseas aid.91 In contrast, in 1994 Britain had a 'sizeable and successful 
bilateral aid programme to Latin America'. The ODA's programme for 1992-
3 allocated to the region £1.06bn of a total budget of some £7.6bn, with 
countries like Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Chile and 
Argentina as well as Grenada and Panama all receiving in excess of f lm. 9 2 
In defining the structure of Britain's aid programme, Lady Chalker listed the 
promotion of good government and 'helping countries build effective 
institutions' as central goals.93 And in the 1994 parliamentary debate on 
Latin America the FCO Minister David Heathcoat-Amory referred to the 
increasing number of aid programmes falling under the general heading of 
good government. 
Aside from some of these more recent and general concerns that have 
come to inform British relations with Latin America, there remain, as in the 
past, a series of bilateral relationships of particular importance. Foremost 
among these is Britain's relationship with Argentina, which after almost a 
decade of hostility has substantially improved. There is no need here to go 
into the history of the longstanding dispute between Britain and Argentina 
over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.94 Suffice it to say that since his election 
in 1989, Carlos Menem has made clear his desire for reconciliation, marking 
the beginning of a new trend in Argentine diplomacy. At the end of the same 
year, working groups from Britain and Argentina met in Paris to discuss the 
vexed question of fishing rights in the Falklands/Malvinas zone. In the 
summer of 1990 the two countries exchanged ambassadors, and in 1991 even 
cooperated militarily during the Gulf War. Foreign Affairs Secretary Douglas 
Hurd made a five-day visit to Argentina in January 1993.95 On 26 September 
1993, Brigadier Richard Lambe, the British UN chief of staff, greeted an 
Argentine military mission which joined Britons for UN duty in Cyprus. Two 
weeks earlier that year, Finance Minister Domingo Cavallo made the first 
91 Marett, Latin America: British Trade and Investment, p. 199. 
92 See Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (238), London, 24 and 28 
February 1994, 390-94, 558. 
93 'Britain's aid strategy in the changing world', Speech to the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 18 October 1993. 
94 See Andrew Orgill, The Falklands War. Background, Conflict, 
Aftermath. An Annotated Bibliography (London, 1993). 
95 See The Financial Times, 6 and 8 January 1993, and The Times, 7 
January 1993. 
official trip to Britain by an Argentine Minister since the war.96 And on 23 
October 1995 Prime Minister John Major met President Carlos Menem in 
New York, where the latter accepted an invitation to visit the United 
Kingdom.97 
The restoration of diplomatic relations under the so-called 'umbrella' 
formula deliberately laid the sovereignty question aside at least for the time 
being. 'We do not agree about sovereignty' - Douglas Hurd told Parliament 
in July 1995. 'We are not prepared to discuss sovereignty, but (if the 
Argentines) are willing to put that aside, we will be perfectly willing to 
develop trade, investment and other contacts.'98 In this context commercial 
relations, as noted, have improved steadily. This has also been due to 
Argentina's privatisation policies, which have allowed the participation of 
British banks, consulting firms and industrial companies in that country. 
Between 1991 and mid-1995 British exports to Argentina rose by 165 per 
cent. Cooperation between the two nations has extended to a number of areas: 
'agreements on visa abolition, air services, judicial co-operation against drug 
trafficking, investment promotion and fisheries ' ." Fisheries, with ilex squid 
at the centre of the dispute, has been a contentious area. Nevertheless, since 
1992 the two governments have been able to strike annual accords on these 
issues, although Britain has been seeking a long-term agreement on 
fisheries.100 Additionally, in November 1995, the two countries signed an 
oil co-operation agreement, a landmark in recent Anglo-Argentine rela-
tions.101 
No other bilateral relationship has come near to matching the importance 
of restoring the Anglo-Argentine connection, in terms of its scope and 
implications for British-Latin American relations. Indeed, it might be argued 
that a breakthrough in Anglo-Argentine relations was a prerequisite for a 
sustained and durable strengthening of British-Latin American relations 
96 The Financial Times, 1 November 1993, and The Times, 27 September 
1993. 
97 The Financial Times, 24 October 1995. 
98 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (263), London, 5 July 1995, p. 368. 
99 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (263), London, 5 July 1995, p. 366. 
See also The Times, Supplement on Argentina, 27 February 1996. 
100 The Financial Times, 8 January 1993,20 October 1993, and 24 October 
1995. 
101 The accord was referred to as 'constructively ambiguous' by The 
Financial Times. Oil was also considered 'the most difficult issue for the two 
governments', as it raised the question of the Falkland Islands' sovereignty. The 
Financial Times, 25 October 1995. 
overall.102 Whether the result of political decisions in London or growing 
political familiarity with the Argentine leadership, the evolving Anglo-
Argentine relationship may be said to form part of a general background of 
changing perceptions and a better climate that has come to characterise 
Britain's relations with the region during the past decade. Nevertheless, as 
already suggested, the renewal of Anglo-Latin American ties in the 1990s has 
also involved stronger relationships with countries that in the past did not 
figure prominently on the British agenda in the region. Colombia, in 
particular, whose position towards the war in the South Atlantic did not pass 
unnoticed in Westminster,103 has developed close links with the United 
Kingdom in this new scenario. 
Colombia's history of friendly relations with Great Britain dates back to 
the official recognition of Latin American independence. But overall the 
British economic presence in Colombia, compared to its presence in 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico - and even Uruguay and Bolivia - has been 
relatively unimportant. This is not to deny the significance of British capital 
and expertise in the development of certain areas of the economy in particular 
periods, nor to deny the considerable British influence in Colombian cultural 
and intellectual life, as well as in political institutions.104 Nonetheless, 
when, in 1938, Colombia and Great Britain attempted to renegotiate the 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation signed by the two countries 
in 1866, the possibilities of expanding trade were limited: 'since Colombia's 
exports to this country consist only of bananas, hides and skins and coffee'. 
There was some British investment in oil, particularly from Shell, and in 
gold. British banks were also active in Colombia. However, all Britain could 
offer at the time to strengthen the relationship were modest increases in the 
imports of coffee and bananas and some scholarships, all within 'narrow 
102 Guillermo Makin, 'The Nature of Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy 1980-
90', in Alex Danchev (ed.), International Perspectives on the Falklands Conflict 
(London, 1992), p. 233. 
103 See, for example, Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (209), London, 9 
June 1992: 143. Colombia's position was to uphold international law and 
therefore it opposed Argentina's use of force in its attempt to solve the conflict. 
This did not mean that Colombia rejected Argentina's claim of sovereignty over 
the islands. Interview with Carlos Lemos Simmonds, Colombian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs at the time of the conflict and Ambassador in London at the time 
of writing (1996). 
104 See M. Deas, 'La influencia inglesa y otras influencias en Colombia', 
in A. Tirado Mejia (ed.), Nueva Historia de Colombia (Bogota, 1984); and C. 
Davila, 'Empresarios y aventureros britanicos y la elite local en Colombia 
durante el siglo XIX', paper delivered at the 47th Congress of Americanists, 
New Orleans, July 1991. 
limits', besides 4an offer relating to credits'.105 This limited interest has 
only been reversed in the last decade, best symbolised by Major's visit to 
Bogota in 1992. 
British economic interests in Colombia were boosted by the discovery of 
oil in the Casanare region, where British Petroleum, alongside the Colombian 
company Ecopetrol and other international consortia, is playing an important 
role. By the end of 1995, in the first stage of a development programme, BP 
was expecting production of 150,000 barrels per day (b/d) of oil from the 
Cusiana fields. The next stage, which involved the building of 'one of the 
world's great pipeline projects of the 1990s', will allow BP to raise 
production to over 600,000 b/d. For BP, as the company's managing 
director, John Browne, confirmed in a speech at Canning House at the end 
of 1993, 'our work in Colombia is a major investment on a world scale. 
We've spent over $0.5 billion there in the last three years, and we will be 
spending another $300 million next year (1994) on both development and 
further exploration'.106 
Other companies have followed suit; since December 1995, for example, 
the leading mining consortium RTZ has announced plans to expand its coal 
operations with a £22.7 million investment in Colombia.107 In spite of 
security problems, as Sir Keith Morris has pointed out, British investors have 
continued to show confidence in the Colombian economy.108 A bilateral 
Trade Facilitation Group, set up after the meeting between John Major and 
Cesar Gaviria in June 1992, identified business opportunities worth between 
$10-14 billion, mainly in oil and gas exploration and development, power 
generation, telecommunications, water services, agroindustry and railways 
rehabilitation.109 Acknowledging the importance of these developments, 
President Gaviria supported the Investment Promotion and Protection 
105 See Board of Trade, 'Commercial Negotiations with Colombia', 18 
August 1939, Public Record Office, FO 371/22742. See also British Legation 
to Foreign Office, Bogota, 2 May 1938, PRO, FO 371/21439. 
106 'Latin American Oil in an International Context'. 
107 '$36m Colombia project for RTZ', The Financial Times, 17 December 
1995. 
108 'Keith Morris, adios a Colombia', El Tiempo, 16 October 1994. 
109 Michael Mowlem, 'The Commercial Opportunities', paper presented to 
the Latin American Parliamentary Group at Canning House, London, 28 June 
1994. 
Agreement which was finally signed with Great Britain in March 1994.110 
Trade has also improved: Colombia was the third largest market in Latin 
America in the 1994 league table of British exports. In addition to closer 
economic links, Britain is also, as noted, helping the Colombian authorities 
to counter the illicit production and trafficking of drugs. In 1989, following 
the visit of a team of British officials to Colombia, an aid package was 
devised to provide technical support to combat the activities of the notorious 
drug cartels.111 
The Colombian experience deserves special attention for it shows how 
economic opportunities provided new inroads for British business in this 
country. A similar pattern, however, emerges throughout the continent -
even, more recently, in Cuba. It has been suggested here that some at least 
of the above changes can be linked to processes related to, or affected by, the 
end of the Cold War. Political and economic liberalisation, both well 
underway before the collapse of Soviet power in Eastern Europe and the 
USSR itself, have made Latin American countries more attractive to Britain 
along with other European countries. They have also brought Latin America 
closer into line with US policies on a number of issues. Yet critically the end 
of the Cold War, by reducing the strategic importance of a region like Latin 
America, and thereby contributing to its perceived 'marginalisation', has also 
contributed to a decoupling of the US-Latin American relationship that may 
directly benefit Europeans. Further, the relative decline in the economic 
position of the United States and the growing economic and political strength 
of Europe, as it emerged from the 1980s, suggests that the latter will 
'inevitably seek a more salient role in a region with which it has historical 
and political affinities'.112 In another way Latin America has become, and 
is recognised as, a more important international player, one whose weight 
110 El Tiempo, 9 March 1994. The signing of the agreement, originally due 
to take place during Gaviria's visit to London in 1993, was delayed for 
constitutional reasons which were the cause of controversy. See, for example, 
'Viaje fallido', Semana, 3 August 1993; and A. Lopez Michelsen, 'El convenio 
con la Gran Bretana', El Tiempo, 8 May 1994. 
111 Stuart Croft (ed.), British Security Policy. The Thatcher Years and the 
End of the Cold War (London, 1991), p. 191. Since 1989, Britain has spent 
£13m in an assistance programme to fight drugs in Colombia - basically 
equipment and training for drug enforcement agencies. See Parliamentary 
Debates. Hansard (253), London, 3 February 1995: 882; and (254), 7 February 
1995: 220. 
112 On this theme see further Alberto van Klaveren, 'Latin America and the 
International Political System of the 1990s', in Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz 
and Augusto Varas (eds.), The United States and Latin America in the 1990s 
(Chapel Hill, 1992), pp. 31-3. 
may be increasingly felt in international fora and must be courted for its 
favours. Collectively Latin American countries have often played a leading 
role in Third World international politics, notably through organisations like 
the Non-Aligned Movement or through United Nation's fora such as 
UNCTAD.113 
Developments within the European Union and in its relations with Latin 
America (as well as Britain's own position with regard to the Union itself) 
also add a new dimension to British-Latin American relations. On the one 
hand, political links between the continent and the European Union have 
greatly intensified, as manifested, for example, in the active role that Europe 
has played in the Central American crisis and in the new interest in and 
commitment to issues such as human rights and democratisation. Economic 
links have been slower to improve: from 1985 to 1995 trade between the two 
regions fell significantly in comparison with previous decades. Yet during the 
three year period 1993-1995 Latin America was described as the 'most 
dynamic market for European exports',114 while the EU remains Latin 
America's second largest trading partner. It is still too early to assess how the 
Single European Market will affect Latin America: fears of a 'Fortress 
Europe' appear exaggerated and the process seems likely to offer benefits as 
well as disadvantages to different countries, at least in the medium term. 
Further, as van Klaveren writes, the 'strength and dynamism of an economi-
cally unified Europe could be felt in Latin America, despite the rather 
marginal weight of the region in Europe's external economic relations'.115 
One positive development was the adoption by the European Union, on 23 
October 1995, of a strategy for strengthening relations with Latin America 
for the period 1996-2000, a move reflecting the new importance of the 
region.116 
Latin America's interest in regional integration on the European model -
as manifested in the various schemes that exist for promoting sub-regional 
integration - and Europe's commitment to promoting such schemes are some 
obvious ways in which the two regions may be brought closer together. The 
impact of the European project can be clearly seen in groupings like the 
Andean Pact or MERCOSUR in their commitment to the creation of common 
113 See for example, Esperanza Duran, European Interests in Latin 
America, Chatham House Papers, No. 28 (London, 1985), p. 8. 
114 European Commission, Bulletin of the European Union, No. 10 (1995), 
pp. 95-6. 
115 Van Klaveren, 'Latin America and the International Political System', 
pp. 33-6. 
116 Bulletin of the European Union, p. 95. 
markets within a certain time frame.117 As Wolf Grabendorff argues, 'in 
coming years Europe and Latin America may drift together because they have 
chosen similar paths to economic and political integration'.118 And while 
EC/EU assistance to Latin American countries is nothing new,119 the 
assistance offered to MERCOSUR countries through the Asia/Latin America 
(ALA) Regulation in 1995, within the context of a EU-MERCOSUR 
'Interregional framework cooperation agreement', signed in December 1995, 
demonstrates the potential at least for an enlarged aid and economic 
cooperation programme at the level of regional institutions.120 
If Europe then can be looked to as an example and model, Britain's 
particular position in the Community together with its historic Atlantic 
connections may offer some advantages. Britain's international profile, and 
its traditional interests in both European and Atlantic circles have encouraged 
claims that Britain is uniquely placed to direct European initiatives in Latin 
America, as well as bringing benefits to relations at the bilateral level. 'The 
United Kingdom', Viscount Montgomery has pointed out, 'can be seen as an 
ally in Europe and as a gateway and bridge into the Community for Latin 
America'.121 The end of the Cold War era has been rightly seen as one 
which has presented Britain with a 'window of opportunity' in many 
developing countries.122 This is particularly so not only given the trans-
formed context of US foreign policy, but also because of the problems facing 
a number of Britain's major partners and rivals (Germany and Italy are 
obvious examples). In suggesting ways in which Britain might redefine its 
117 See Louise Fawcett, 'Regionalism in historical perspective', in Louise 
Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), Regionalism in World Politics (Oxford, 
1995), p. 24. On the broader theme of 'Regionalism in the Americas', see 
Hurrell's chapter in the same volume. 
118 Wolf Grabendorff, 'European Integration: Implications for Latin 
America', in Colin I. Bradford (ed.), Strategic Options for Latin America in the 
1990s (Paris, 1992), p. 239. 
119 For a summary of such assistance since 1975 see Guadalupe Ruiz-
Gimenez, 'La agenda de los noventa para America Latina: la contribution de la 
CE', Revista de Occidente, no. 131 (April 1992), pp. 151-62. 
120 See Minister of Trade's speech to the MERCOSUR conference, Bulletin 
of the EU, p. 96. 
121 Parliamentary Debates. Lords, London, 19 December 1990: 834. See 
also similar comments by Jacques Arnold in Parliamentary Debates. Hansard 
(177), London, 23 July 1990. 
122 See, for example, James Morgan, 'Wide Horizons, Slender Means: the 
Scope for British Influence', International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 4 (1992), pp. 
603-17. 
foreign policies for a new era, William Wallace writes: 4 We could build onto 
our position as Europe's most attractive base for extra-European investment 
a more explicit and developed image of Britain as a link between Europe and 
the developed world - securely rooted in European cooperation, but pursuing 
close and mutual relations with North America and Japan...'123 The 
argument, as noted, may equally be extended to the developing world. 
Britain's position in Europe could also help mitigate the fears of Latin 
American and other developing countries of the adverse impact of a 'fortress 
Europe'. In this context, Conservative governments have always been 
anxious to reassure Britain's non-European trading partners and to stress 
their opposition to such a development: in the 1991 Latin American debate 
Ray Whitney referred to the 'suspicion and fear that, in creating a single 
market in 1992, we shall create the old cliche of a fortress Europe'. And he 
continued: 'One of the prime contributions that the United Kingdom has made 
and will continue to make is to ensure that we create not a fortress Europe but 
a dynamic market of 320m people, which is politically stable, makes a 
contribution to world peace and creates the opportunities for greater trade 
among all the countries of the world, not least Latin America.'124 
The limits to revival 
For all the optimism expressed above, there remain some all too apparent 
constraints on any major further developments in British-Latin American 
relations. There has been much legitimate criticism of any premature 
celebration of a great revival. In 1989, from the opposition benches, Jeremy 
Corbyn voiced the opinion that 'one of the problems with British policy 
towards Latin America is that there is no policy - just a series of decisions 
which may or may not be made on national or economic issues. There is very 
little overall strategy'.125 Such views have since been echoed elsewhere. 
According to Laurence Whitehead, for example, the British government's 
policy on debt, drug trafficking or environmental conservation all directly 
affect Latin America but do not 'constitute a Latin American policy, certainly 
not in the way that London consciously shapes and coordinates relations with 
123 William Wallace, 'Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United 
Kingdom', International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 1 (1991), p. 79. 
124 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (177), London, 22 July 1991. See also 
Ray Whitney's intervention, in similar vein, in the 1994 debate in ibid. (229), 
20 July 1994. 
125 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (157), London, 27 July 1989: 1316. 
Europe or the USA or even with South Africa or India'.126 
Although such criticisms do not lack some validity, they undervalue the 
changes of the last decade, as outlined in the previous section, particularly 
when set against the steady decline of British interest in the region since the 
1930s, or against the realities of Latin America's international position. After 
all, neither economically, politically nor strategically can Latin America 
possibly hope to compete for Britain's attention with Europe or the United 
States. Nor, with a few exceptions, do any comparable historical links exist 
such as those which bind Britain to the Commonwealth or to countries of the 
Middle East. Indeed, precisely given its relatively peripheral status one 
should be looking more closely at the 'signs of rediscovery' described here. 
Within the constraints of a limited relationship, and in a period of shifting 
international priorities on both sides, considerable progress has been made. 
Yet there is also a need to separate myth from reality, facts from rhetoric. 
Despite the evidence accumulated in this paper, there are some contradictions 
to the argument that British-Latin American relations are undergoing a 
revival. In this last section, we explore some of these contradictions: in 
particular we look at cuts in diplomatic staff and, above all, at British policies 
towards trade when traditional loyalties with other regions are at stake. 
Finally, we also look at the possible responses of Latin America to these 
contradictions. All these point to some of the limitations which impede a 
deeper relationship developing between Britain and Latin America. 
The somewhat rosy and optimistic picture that emerges from a study of 
recent relations in the past decade is contradicted, for example, by the cost-
cutting exercises that have continued at certain levels of diplomatic and 
cultural relations. Douglas Hurd's declared intention to give the continent 
greater priority notwithstanding, there came a subsequent decision to cut 
levels of diplomatic staff in British embassies throughout Latin America. As 
John Wilkinson pointed out in the 1991 parliamentary debate on Latin 
America, it was difficult for the government to 'effectively support our 
business men and our strategic aims to maintain a fruitful relationship with 
Latin America as a whole... if, at the same time, the government are 
reducing our diplomatic presence and cutting posts in our embassies. Too 
many posts in South America have been cut to the bone and some South 
American countries do not have a fully manned British post'.127 Such cuts 
126 Laurence Whitehead, 'Britain and Latin America', paper presented to 
the IRELA Workshop, Barcelona, 5 October 1990, p. 1; see also his 'Britain, 
Latin America and the European Community', in Bulmer-Thomas, Britain and 
Latin America, pp. 83-4. 
127 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (177), London, 22 July 1991: 852. 
were justified by the Foreign Secretary himself as compensation for the need 
to expand the diplomatic corps in the Far East. And in defending this decision 
a Times editorial argued that 'Britain's essential interests are limited to 
Europe, North America and its chief trading partners in the Far East... Even 
at the sacrifice of commercial opportunities, embassies in Africa and Latin 
America may have to give way to regional centres in key countries.'128 The 
number of British consular offices in Latin America actually increased from 
33 to 41 over the five year period 1987-1992, but this was mostly due to the 
new appointments of honorary consuls, providing assistance and advice to 
British nationals 'at minimal cost'.129 The advantages of the European 
relationship too can be objected to in much the same way. Have developments 
in Europe, or indeed Britain's particular position in Europe, really 
strengthened the prospects of either British-Latin American or European-
Latin American relations? Problems obviously remain with regard to 
strengthening European as well as British links with the continent, although 
some European countries - Spain is one example - would appear to have a 
stronger interest in forging closer relations.130 The fact remains that for 
Europe as for Britain, Latin America - 'the great forgotten area of the 
EC'131 - simply has not been a traditional priority: 'hard facts and achieve-
ments have not yet kept pace with the political pronouncements and 
expressions of goodwill made by political leaders in both regions.'132 The real 
impact of the 'Europe 1992' project has still to be felt, and there are those 
who argue that its effects will be deeply damaging to Latin America.133 The 
trade picture, for example, remains one of great asymmetry - an asymmetry 
particularly worrying to Latin Americans. Finally, there is always the danger 
128 'Transcript of a speech given by the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, 
to the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House on 27 May 
1993', The Times, 31 May 1993. 
129 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard{2\6), London, 11 January 1993:559-
60. 
130 Partly at Spanish instigation, the EC extended in 1990 its superior 
tranche of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) to four countries of the 
Andean Pact. See Christopher Stevens et al., 'EC Trade Preferences and a Post-
apartheid South Africa', International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 1 (1993), pp. 92-3. 
131 Ruiz-Gimenez, 'La agenda de las 90', p. 154. 
132 Freres et al., 'Europa y America Latina', p. 104; Duran, European 
Interests in Latin America, pp. 9-10. 
133 For a breakdown of the positive and negative effects of the Single 
European Market for Latin America, see Grabendorff, 'European Integration: 
Implications for Latin America', and the updated Spanish version: La integra-
cion Europea: consecuencias para America Latina', in Smtesis (Madrid), no. 18 
(Sept./Dec. 1992), pp. 15-51. 
is always the danger that the twin forces of economic and political 
liberalisation that have made Latin America more attractive to Europeans 
could prove reversible. 
There are clearly, then, some very real and concrete obstacles to any 
substantial change in the nature of British-Latin American relations. Perhaps 
no other issue illustrates both the current difficulties and the potential 
contradictions of British policies towards the region as clearly as the 'Euro-
Banana' conflict, to which we now turn our attention. 
The Single European Market, which came into effect on 1 January 1993, 
gave rise to great expectations among Latin American banana producers. 
Hitherto many European markets had effectively been restricted to them due 
to preferential arrangements previously existing between ACP134 and 
Mediterranean producers. With 40 per cent of world consumption of the fruit 
already concentrated in Europe, the 1990s saw an increased demand for the 
banana. This was both as a result of its increased popularity in countries like 
Britain135 (a phenomenon also noted in Japan), where it appeared to be 
overtaking the orange as the second most popular fruit after the apple, but 
also because of the new demand from former Eastern bloc countries. Here, 
with the collapse of Soviet power, the banana had become identified as a 
'symbol of liberty'.136 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that this potentially 
lucrative market became the object of one of the most intense 'lobbying' 
operations in the recent history of the European Union.137 
The search for a single regime for the European banana market has divided 
consumers and producers alike. Under previous arrangements, Latin 
American producers were subject to a quota system and tariff barriers of up 
to 20 per cent, imposed by a majority of EU members, with the important 
exception of Germany, the largest European consumer of the fruit. For their 
part, banana producers from the former European possessions and colonies 
of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific enjoyed a preferential set of trading 
arrangements. Spain and Portugal have also retained special links with 
traditional suppliers in the Canary Islands and Madeira, France with 
134 ACP: Former European possessions and colonies in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific. 
135 Consumption of bananas in the United Kingdom almost doubled between 
1985 and 1995; see Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (263), London, 19 July 
1995: 1470. 
136 The Daily Telegraph, 19 July 1991. 
137 See Financial Times, 6 April 1992 and 30 June 1993. 
Guadeloupe and Martinique.138 In 1990, two-thirds of the 425,000 tons of 
bananas consumed in Britain originated from plantations in Jamaica and the 
Windward Islands: St. Lucia, Dominica, St. Vincent and Grenada, again with 
producer access to British markets guaranteed under the Banana Protocol of 
the Lome Convention. 
The prospects of any unified regime controlling the import of bananas to 
EU countries raised as many fears as hopes among banana producers 
worldwide, given their different and often opposing interests. On the one 
hand, the ACP countries feared competition from the cheaper and better 
quality Latin American product. On the other hand, the Latin American 
producers faced the possibility that the previously existing discriminatory 
regime, or indeed any new regime, would be extended to all EU members. 
For the Europeans themselves, the banana dispute has also brought to the fore 
serious conflicts of interest and loyalties. Whatever the decision, it would 
affect at once their commitments to their former colonies and possessions, to 
the Uruguay round of GATT talks on trade liberalisation, and not least to 
their own consumers. 
Throughout the course of the debate, in particular since its intensification 
in mid-1991, Britain's position moved clearly in favour of protection of the 
Caribbean producers, and by extension the interests of the large companies 
like Geest and Fyffes, who have traditionally dominated the British 
market.139 At the level of public opinion the conflict was presented some-
what simplistically as a struggle between 'Euro' and 'dollar' bananas, or in 
other words between the big US multinationals controlling continental 
production and the smaller Caribbean island producers, historically attached 
to the European metropolis, whose protection is seen as essential to 
survival.140 There is little doubt that the concerns of the Caribbean pro-
ducers are genuine. 'If we lose the industry we lose the country' said the 
138 For a short description of the arrangements existing prior to 1993, see 
Brent Borell and Sandy Cuthbertson, 'EC banana policies', Hemisphere, Fall 
1992, pp. 32-4. 
139 See Peter N. Davies, Fyffes and the Banana. A Centenary History, 
1888-1988 (London & Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1990). 
140 See, forexample: 'Assured EC access urged for banana producers', The 
Financial Times, 17 March 1992; 'New order of the banana falls foul of the old 
bunch', The Independent, 31 May 1992; 'Big Bananas, Little Bananas and a 
Whole Jungle of Banana Skins', The Daily Telegraph, 19 July 1992; 'The great 
European banana split', The Times, 3 March 1993. As some of these headlines 
suggest, despite the significance of the issue for many producing countries, 
bananas are far from being taken seriously as a subject of discussion by opinion 
makers. 
Dominican prime minister in April 1992, a not invalid claim considering that 
60% of the country's external income and 15% of its workforce is dependent 
on banana exports.141 Studies conducted by the World Bank considered 
nonetheless that the protectionist measures of the European Union in favour 
of the ACP countries would ultimately bring more benefits to the big trading 
companies and the importing countries themselves, whilst also being the 
source of great inefficiencies.142 Yet in the wider debate the political 
arguments predominate over the economic, as suggested by the conclusions 
of a report prepared by the International Coalition for Development Action, 
favouring the interests of the former colonies. As Lord Glenconner reminded 
his colleagues in the House of Lords in November 1992: 'We are not talking 
about banana republics... but banana kingdoms since in these countries Her 
Majesty the Queen is the Head of State'.143 On various occasions during 
parliamentary discussions, the British government confirmed its determina-
tion to ensure that any single regime for the banana would not run counter to 
commitments made under the Lome Conventions. Yet at the same time it 
recognised that any new arrangement reached should be compatible with the 
ongoing GATT negotiations.144 
In April 1992, the European Commission (EC) appeared to be moving 
towards the adoption of a tariff/quota system aimed at protecting the old 
colonies, while Latin American producers continued to press for a tariff 
regime which would at least not exclude them from competing in the new 
European market of some 336 million potential consumers. In August the 
same year a more explicit proposal to limit Latin American imports to a quota 
of 2 million tonnes was attacked both by the Union of Banana Exporting 
Countries (UBEC) and by the Association of Jamaican Banana Exporters.145 
In December, just one month before the Single European Market was due to 
141 See The Financial Times, 10 September 1991 and 6 April 1992. See also 
A. Maingot, 'La guerra del banano en el Caribe: anticipando cambios globales', 
Foro International, vol. XXXII, no. 1, July-September 1991, pp. 65-83. 
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London 23 November 1992: 876. 
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145 The Financial Times, 15 April and 28 August 1992. UBEC comprises 
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come into operation, negotiations deadlocked. At this point, the British 
government, holding the presidency of the European Commission, put 
forward a proposal, which, in combining a tariff and quota system, 
guaranteed the protection of the Caribbean producers. This was the formula 
finally adopted by the EC, effective as of 1 July 1993: the first two tonnes of 
imported bananas would be subject to a tariff of 100 Ecu (£79.50); any 
imports above this quota would be subject to a higher tariff: of 700 Ecu 
(£560).146 
This decision was unanimously rejected by the UBEC countries as well as 
other banana exporters who see themselves as discriminated against by the 
imposition of a system overtly favouring traditional suppliers. In Ecuador, 
for example, where some 100,000 jobs appeared threatened as a direct result 
of the EC ruling, there were violent protests. In January 1993 furious 
demonstrators dumped bunches of bananas in front of the French Embassy in 
Quito and burned the French flag, before continuing their protest in front of 
the British and German embassies.147 In May 1993 the Colombian journal 
Semana produced a report claiming that the new ruling was prejudicial to the 
Colombian companies marketing the fruit: Uniban, Proban and Banacol.148 
The Germans, too, were naturally dissatisfied with an arrangement which 
obliged them to buy their fruit at considerably higher prices. But their 
subsequent attempts through the European Court of Justice to suspend the 
measures proved in vain. Meanwhile the Latin American producers took their 
case to the GATT, where they first succeeded in securing the establishment 
of a special panel to consider the implications of the new regime imposed by 
the Community.149 Six months later, in January 1994, a GATT report 
upheld the complaint by five Latin American countries that the EU policy 
towards bananas contravened GATT rules. In spite of GATT's condemnation 
the EU has continued to implement its preferential banana trade, with strong 
British support.150 However, Brussels was able to appease some of the Latin 
American producers by reaching an agreement over higher quotas with 
146 See The Financial Times, 9, 11 and 18 December 1993. 
147 The Financial Times, 20 January 1993. 
148 Semana, Bogota, 25 May 1993. 
149 The Financial Times, 30 June and 27 July 1993; Latin American Weekly 
Report, 24 June 1993, p. 281 and 1 July 1993, p. 298. 
150 'We fought hard to safeguard (the Windward Islands banana industry's) 
interests in the EC banana regime', acknowledged in Parliament the Foreign 
Office; Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (259), London, 10 May 1995:464. See 
also The Financial Times, 14, 18, 20 and 23 January 1994. 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela.151 Although after this 
agreement, in March 1994, the EU declared an 'end to the row over 
bananas', there are still some disaffected countries, including Guatemala and 
the United States, which also threatened to retaliate against Colombia and 
Costa Rica.152 
The so-called 'banana war' has, then, served to highlight some of the 
contradictions vis-a-vis Britain's relationship with Latin America and indeed 
Europe, as well as demonstrating the clear conflict of loyalties. From a 
general angle, as The Financial Times observed, British 'support for the 
banana regime blatantly contradicts its professed commitment to free 
trade'.153 The dispute has strengthened - at least among Latin Americans 
- the idea of a Fortress Europe that Britain had gone to such great pains to 
dispel. On a number of occasions in the House of Commons, as noted 
previously, MPs made reference to the particular role that Britain could play 
in the EC in ensuring that 'we create not a fortress Europe' but 'a dynamic 
market of 320 million people'. This role, in terms of banana policies at least, 
has so far not been played. Thus, a Financial Times editorial concluded: 'It 
was supposed that the EC common market would serve to lower prices and 
increase competition. But in the case of bananas, the programme has run off 
course.'154 In short, the banana issue has served perhaps as a salutary 
reminder of the limitations inherent in any new British-Latin American 
relationship and indeed in any blossoming EU-Latin American initiative. As 
Freres et al. have noted: 'The conflict generated over the extension to other 
EC markets of the discriminatory regime applied by France, the United 
Kingdom, Italy and Spain to restrict access of the more competitive Latin 
American banana exports, constitutes another demonstration of the potential 
gravity of the commercial problems existing between the two regions.'155 
In the face of a 'Fortress Europe' or, in particular, of a Britain tied by its 
traditional loyalties, Latin Americans may feel that they would be better off 
exploring other frontiers. Strengthening even further links with the United 
States and Canada, which are, after all, closer to home, might be perceived 
as the natural and perhaps the only alternative route. The North American 
151 The Financial Times, 30 March 1994, and Parliamentary Debates. 
Hansard (253), London, 26 January 1995: 361. 
152 In the course of revising this paper, it was announced that the USA had 
dropped its investigation into Colombia and Costa Rica. See 'Kantor drops US 
banana inquiry', The Financial Times, 11 January 1996. 
153 'Yes, the EU's gone bananas', The Financial Times, 25 January 1995. 
154 'Gone bananas', The Financial Times, 3 June 1993. 
155 Freres et al., 'Europa y America Latina', p. 98. 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) points in this direction, although Mexico 
is in a different position from the rest of its Latin American neighbours. And 
the Mexican crisis has retarded any possibility of expansion of such 
integration. Latin American countries are also looking for ways of strength-
ening links among themselves. Sub-regional organisations are on the 
ascendant - MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact or the G-3 (Colombia, Mexico, 
Venezuela), but looking to their own resources has its obvious limitations. 
Some Latin American countries have also started to look further afield. 
Chile, for example, has for long been strengthening ties with the Pacific,156 
as demonstrated by its recent association with the APEC. Britain has a lot to 
offer to Latin America, but in the more open and competitive international 
scenario of the post-cold war era, Latin Americans are well aware of the 
existence of other possibilities.157 How Latin Americans themselves 
perceive the prospects of this 4new relationship' with Britain is therefore a 
significant question. An 'aggressive' or a 'passive' Latin American 
diplomacy in this country would make a considerable difference to British 
inroads in the region. 
Conclusions 
When Sir Kenneth James, in his 1991 New Year message, alerted the 
members of Canning House to the need not to waste the new opportunities for 
renewing British-Latin American relations, it was like yet another replay of 
an old refrain.158 Certainly, his optimism was not entirely unfounded. After 
several decades in which Latin America had become increasingly distanced 
from the mainstream of British concerns, there were indeed several signs that 
relations were entering a new dynamic phase. Now, some five years later, 
many of the 'signs of rediscovery' are still present - as this paper has amply 
156 See, for example, P. Armanet, 'Politica de Chile en la cuenca del 
Pacifico; perspectivas para la decada del noventa', Estudios Internationales, no. 
92, January-March 1992, pp. 41-72. Armanet suggests that the Pacific could be 
an alternative to a 'fortress Europe', see ibid., p. 59. See also C. Moreno Laval, 
'America Latina y la cuenca del Pacifico', Estudios Internationales, July-
September 1991, pp. 336-83. 
157 At a London meeting, asked by a Latin American diplomat what Great 
Britain had to offer to Latin America, a Conservative MP dismissed the 
significance of the question with a hint of arrogance. Instead of listing the 
various reasons - and there are many - for Latin Americans to pay greater 
attention to Britain, his reply implied that this was simply a matter of 'take it or 
leave it'. 
158 'A Letter from the Director General to Corporate Members of Canning 
House', London, January 1991. 
demonstrated - even if some have become a little tarnished. 
The resurgence of British 'enthusiasm' for Latin America in the 1990s has 
some precedents - all of them soon followed by disenchantment. 'Throughout 
my commercial life' , Lord Nelson of Stafford observed in 1972, 'I can 
remember the saying that South America was about to "take-off".' And he 
added a caustic note: 'The great difficulty is to ascertain its timing.'159 
Nowadays the idea, as expressed by Minister Chalker, is repeated once 
again: the region is full of great potential.160 This time, however, British 
renewed interest has occurred under different circumstances from past 
experiences. The processes of political and, above all, economic reforms 
undergone in Latin America have been crucial in this new rapprochement. 
The consolidation of these reforms conditions the strengthening of British 
ties in Latin America. Closer economic links are at the heart of British policy 
towards the region. 'Increasingly, the flag follows the trade', Douglas Hurd 
stated from a general angle. One of his Ministers put it more directly: 'the 
prospects for Latin America and our relationship with it depend so much on 
trade'.161 Among many other factors, the expansion of trade from this side 
of the Atlantic will depend on the willingness of British businessmen to 
continue investing in Latin American markets. Past records are not always 
encouraging. And the recent Mexican crisis only serves to fuel those images 
crudely recalled by Jacques Arnold, 'too many British businessmen still 
regard Latin America as an uncomfortable, hot place run by caudillos, 
saddled with debt, not paying their bills, destroying their forests and growing 
and peddling drugs'.162 As Latin American countries enter into the 1990s 
with a firm commitment to open up their economies, how they are perceived 
by the outside world has become all the more relevant.163 The question of 
'image' has ceased to be a trivial matter confined to the agenda of cultural 
159 Parliamentary Debates. Lords (327), 26 January 1972: 371. About the 
same time, the Director of the Bank of London and South America, Sir George 
Bolton, predicted that by the end of the century economic and political 
developments will make the region the source of envy to many a European 
country; cited in Marett, Latin America: British Trade and Investment, p. 78. 
160 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (138), London, 1988: 728. 
161 See 'Transcript of a speech given by the Foreign Secretary'; and 
Parliamentary Debates, Hansard (177), 22 July 1991: 860. 
162 Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (177), London, 23 July 1990: 250. 
For similar remarks, see idem (138), 28 July 1988: 709, and (157) 22 July 1989: 
1322. 
163 See, for example, The Economist Intelligence Unit, Latin America. 
Regional Overview, London, second quarter, 1992, p. 7. 
attaches.164 
The changing context of British foreign policy, alluded to in this paper, has 
also conditioned relations with Latin America. It has been argued that both 
at the bilateral and the European level there are opportunities for Britain to 
consolidate and expand relations with Latin America. Britain's increased 
commitment to Europe, overturning the Churchillian order of international 
priorities, need not be detrimental to Latin America. The attractions Britain 
once held for the Latin American continent may not be restored in full. Yet 
within the context of a limited relationship, there is considerable scope for 
British policy. 
The prospect of a Labour government after the next general election poses 
some questions about sustaining Britain's renewed interest in Latin America. 
Economic considerations - in particular the opportunities offered to British 
business by the liberalisation of Latin American countries, have been at the 
centre of Conservative policies towards the region. Indeed, the process of 
economic reform was much inspired by British Conservative policy. The 
Labour party has been accommodating to the new global impetus in favour 
of market forces, but Labour obviously does not share the Conservatives' 
enthusiasm for free trade. If the interventions of Jeremy Corbyn in parlia-
ment - he is the most active Labour MP in the Latin American debates - are 
indicative of Labour views, some change in emphasis at least should be 
expected. Corbyn, however, is perhaps an example of Labour radicalism.165 
Other, more moderate views, such as those expressed by Tony Lloyd, may 
be more representative. And past Labour governments have shown pragma-
164 This question was addressed in a conference organised by Canning 
House and the Institute of Latin American Studies in London: 'Reflections of 
Latin America in the European Media', on 13-14 February 1995. 
165 Confrontation between Corbyn's views and those of his Conservative 
colleagues has become a familiar scene in the debates on Latin America. After 
the opening statement of the last debate (1995), when Jacques Arnold praised 
economic and political developments in the region and British renewed interests 
in Latin America, Jeremy Corbyn replied: 'It is difficult for me to follow the 
hon. Member for Gravesham (Mr Arnold), as I found little with which I could 
agree in what he said, and his interpretation of history should be filed under 
"Sycophantic"'. Conservatives, in turn, use Corbyn's views on Latin America 
to contradict the picture of 'new Labour': 'old Labour is alive and well on the 
Opposition benches and marching firmly in the wrong ideological direction'; 
Parliamentary Debates. Hansard (264), London, 18 October 1995: 267, and 
270. 
tism in dealing with Latin American economic relations.166 Nevertheless, 
economic considerations may take second place under Labour with other 
concerns - human rights, the environment and drugs - taking higher priority. 
Whatever the party label of the next government, there is little doubt that 
Latin American diplomacy will continue to face serious challenges. The 
generally old-fashioned ministries of foreign affairs throughout the region 
can scarcely compete with the intense activity of lobby groups outside their 
countries - be they concerned with economic or human rights issues. When 
in 1988 Sir Geoffrey Howe referred optimistically to the revival of interest 
in Latin America - 'Hope in a time of change' - he was setting a new British 
agenda for the region. This paper has attempted to review how this agenda 
has progressed in the past decade. The extent to which Latin American 
countries perceive this 'window of opportunity', and whether or not they 
accept its challenges, remains to be seen. 
166 See, for example, M. D. Wilkinson, 'The Chile Solidarity Campaign 
and British Government Policy towards Chile, 1973-1990', European Review of 
Latin American and Caribbean Studies, no. 52, June 1992, pp. 59-65. 
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